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Mapping Maritime Power and Control:  
A Study of the Late Eighteenth Century 
Qisheng Yanhai Tu
(A Coastal Map of the Seven Provinces)
Ronald C. Po, London School of Economics
Introduction
The term “sea power” usually conjures images of western sea power – 
past and present.1 Yet, in the eighteenth century, the Qing Empire also 
projected state power over the oceans off China’s coast. The fact that the 
Qing was founded and administered by the Jürchen peoples of northeast 
Asia, who were renowned for their land-based military campaigns, does 
not necessarily mean that they failed to exert their influence along the 
maritime frontier (haijiang).2 With the annexation of Taiwan by the 
Kangxi emperor in 1683, the Qing gained control of the littoral stretching 
from the Bohai Sea to the Guangdong coast. Throughout the long 
eighteenth century (1683–1839), the Qing exercised sovereignty over the 
* An earlier version of this article was presented at the AAS-in-Asia Conference held in 
Taipei (June 22–24, 2015). The author is grateful to Helen Siu, Loretta Kim, Timothy Brook, 
and participants in the conference. This article also owes a great debt to Tobie Meyer-Fong, 
Carla Nappi and two anonymous reviewers, whose insights and suggestions were crucial to its 
gestation. 
1. See, for instance, the introductions of E.B. Potter, Sea Power: A Naval History; Wallinga, 
Ships and Sea-Power Before the Great Persian War; Stevens, History of Sea Power; and 
Cuyvers, Sea Power: A Global Journey.
2. See for instance, Yangwen Zheng, China on the Sea; Gang Zhao, The Qing Opening to 
the Ocean; and Wensheng Wang, White Lotus Rebels and South China Pirates.
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sea by deploying a navy,3 establishing a maritime customs system,4 and 
facilitating a series of mapping and information-gathering initiatives.5 
This paper will focus on one of these very significant developments: the 
charting of the Qing naval frontier in a coastal map (hai tu), entitled The 
Coastal Map of the Seven Provinces (Qisheng yanhai tu; hereafter the 
yanhai tu).6 The yanhai tu is one of the few pictorial maps that depicted 
the contours of the coastal regions and the immediate sea space under 
the control of the Qing Empire before the First Opium War (1839–42). 
It includes detailed paratextual information that touches upon various 
issues, such as the importance of coastal defense, the significance of 
the Bohai Sea (a maritime territory that has long been overlooked by 
eighteenth-century historians), the logic defining inner and outer sea 
spaces, as well as the topographies of strategic islands off the China 
coast. These paratextual details provide evidence of the deliberate 
manner in which the Qing court conceptualized the maritime frontier. 
Careful analysis of this map challenges the conventional image of the 
Qing Empire as a land-based power that cared little about the ocean 
before the arrival of western imperialism in the mid-nineteenth century.7 
This paper does not argue for equivalency between Qing and European 
engagement with the sea, but rather seeks to show that the Qing dynasty 
was more involved in maritime management than has previously been 
acknowledged.
3. See for instance, Wang Hongbin, Qingdai qianqi haifang, and Li Qilin, Qingdai qianqi 
yanhai de shuishi yu zhanchan.
4. Chen Kuo-tung, Qingdai qianqi de Yue haiguan yu shisanhang; Gang Zhao, The Qing 
Opening to the Ocean, 116–36; Huang Guosheng, Yapian zhanzheng qian de dongnan sisheng 
haiguan; Zhang Bincun, “Ming Qing liangchao de haiwai maoyi zhengce.”
5. Compared to other topics such as naval development and customs management, the 
mapping projects of the maritime frontier in the High Qing have not been studied thoroughly. 
For an introduction to the developing literature related to maritime China and East Asia from 
1500 to 1800, see Wills, “Interactive Early Modern Asia.”
6. This map consists of five sheets and is meant to be spread out from right to left, followed 
by four submaps entitled “Qiongzhou tu” (Map of Qiongzhou), “Penghu tu” (Map of the 
Pescadores), “Taiwan tu” (Map of Taiwan), and “Taiwan houshan tu” (Map of Taiwan behind 
the mountains).
7. Wills, China and Maritime Europe, 1500–1800, 17.
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Territoriality and Cartography
In 2000, Charles Maier’s conceptualization of territoriality “reconfigured 
the periodization of modern world history.”8 He noted that in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, new dynasties or “more cohesively 
organized territorial states” began to “fortif[y] their frontiers and 
redefin[e] sovereignty to give themselves unrestricted authority within 
their own domains.”9 For Maier, the early modern period comprised “the 
great epoch of enclosure: both the enclosure of common lands within 
the villages of Britain and Western Europe and the enclosure of state 
borders.”10 In order to secure their territorial and social boundaries, 
states had to fight against external incursion and invasion. Maier rightly 
points out that this process was not limited to Western Europe. China, 
Russia, and the Ottoman Empire also developed more precise definitions 
of the space under the state’s control at that time. For instance, by signing 
the Nerchinsk and Kiakhta Treaties with the Qing in 1689 and 1727, 
respectively, Russia defined its borders in the east, fixing what is now the 
border of Mongolia west of the Argun River and opening up the caravan 
trade. After eliminating the Zunghar Empire in the early eighteenth 
century, the Qing also reconfigured the boundary of its northwestern 
frontier.11 Maier’s concept of territoriality, although principally based 
on land, enables us to periodize developments in the early modern 
period in Asia as well as Europe. Taking China as an example, through 
mapping, information-gathering, and history-writing projects during 
the long eighteenth century, Qing rulers and scholars strove to project 
the all-encompassing gaze of the empire onto the maritime world. They 
also worked to define maritime territories by setting up administrative 
boundaries on the sea so that bureaucrats could carry out maritime 
affairs (haiyang zhishi) using direct, uniform rules. Two Chinese terms 
that recur frequently in Qing imperial edicts and official documents, 
jinghai and dinghai, characterize the imperial ideology toward maritime 
affairs. The term hai refers to the ocean, while the characters jing and ding 
8. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, MA.: 
Harvard University Press, 2005), 409.
9. Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History,” 808.
10. Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth Century to History,” 808.
11. See Kessler, K’ang-hsi and the Consolidation of Ch’ing Rule, 97–103; Mancall, Russia 
and China, chaps. 2–5.
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mean to level, pacify, and bring under control. Sometimes these terms 
also imply making things permanent and fixing them in place, as well as 
subjugating. For example, the renowned admiral Shi Lang (1621–96), who 
led the Qing naval conquest of Taiwan, was bestowed the title “Jinghai 
hou” (the duke who pacified the ocean).
By examining the cartography used to map the maritime frontier, 
scholars can better understand early modern ideas of sovereignty and 
territoriality. Maps are instruments of military, fiscal, and commercial 
power that define strategic locations and efficient routes for military 
movement. They also fix territory in space and show trade routes.12 In 
facilitating a series of mapping projects, early modern monarchs sought 
to consolidate their control over their domains. They simultaneously 
strove to establish boundaries when “sovereignty was gradually becoming 
increasingly tied to territorial integrity.”13 Cartography, therefore, had 
a significant role in the creation and extension of empires in the early 
modern period, including the Qing. From the Kangxi to the Qianlong 
reigns, the Qing court took the initiative in sponsoring the development 
of scientific survey and mapping technology, while simultaneously 
continuing to promote indigenous cartographic conventions.14 As Joanna 
Waley-Cohen has persuasively pointed out, the Kangxi emperor “himself 
greatly valued Jesuit cartography; under his auspices, missionaries 
undertook a ten-year survey of the entire empire that formed the 
foundation for all subsequent geographic study of China.”15 In a similar 
vein, the Qianlong emperor was also obsessed with large-scale mapping 
projects. He seems to have viewed the practice of mapping as a means to 
legitimate Manchu rule and glorify his empire.16 One of the most striking 
examples of this is a series of sixteen prints by highly skilled French 
engravers. These prints, like the maps of the “Jesuit Atlas” (Huangyu 
12. As succinctly argued by Benedict Anderson, “the development of cartography paralleled 
the growth of national consciousness and an era of exploration abroad.” See his Imagined 
Communities, chap. 10, “Census, Map, and Museum.” See also Buisseret, ed., Monarchs, 
Ministers, and Maps, chap. 5, “Space.”
13. Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise, 74.
14. Mark Elliott also argues that cartographic projects in the Qing were important because 
they enabled the representation of a space that the Manchus could claim as their own, thereby 
sustaining the idea of superior Manchu power. See Elliott, “The Limits of Tartary.”
15. Waley-Cohen, “China and Western Technology in the Late Eighteenth Century,” 1529.
16. Millward, “Coming onto the Map,” 69.
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quanlan tu),17 combined Chinese and western cartographic traditions in 
projects sponsored by the Qing court so as to project imperial might.18
In addition to maps produced in the Qing imperial court, other 
notable mapping projects were also initiated by motivated officials.19 
Provincial officials, in particular, even promoted such mapping to 
produce “a total view of the empire” (quanlan) for different purposes, 
e.g. showcasing the empire’s prosperity or providing a more detailed 
picture of frontier regions to the government. Unlike private maps of 
western and northern Europe (such as Niels Darre’s map of Norway) 
that were produced wholly independently of government influence, 
most of the maps produced by Qing provincial officials were generated 
under imperial supervision and aimed at serving the imperial court.20 As 
Richard J. Smith points out, “map making was closely connected with 
both the officials and the throne, who tried to control the production 
and circulation of maps, in late imperial China.”21 These “provincial 
cartographers” worked as ordinary civil servants in their mapping 
projects for Qing monarchs and the imperial government. Thus, maps 
produced in provinces (which should rightly be called “provincial maps”) 
served the same goal and agenda of consolidating the empire’s sovereignty 
and its “territorial identity” as those produced in Beijing. Even though 
these provincial maps were not printed inside the Forbidden City, they 
were considered official and were part of the empire building project of 
the Qing.
Recent studies of the cultural history of cartography have pointed 
out that geographic knowledge is inextricably tied to the political 
environment.22 In the words of Jeremy Black, “there is no sharp 
17. The Jesuit Atlas has been called “the Kangxi Atlas” and the “Kangxi Jesuit Atlas.” These 
expressions reflect the debate among historians as to whether this achievement was a Chinese 
or a European product. See Cordell D.K. Yee, “Traditional Chinese Cartography and the 
Myth of Westernization,” 184–85; Needham, Science and Civilisation in China (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1959, reprinted 1995), vol. 3, 590. For a classic study on the Atlas, 
see also Fuchs, Der Jesuiten-Atlas der Kanghsi-Zeit.
18. Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 3, 585–86.
19. Cordell D.K. Yee, “Chinese Maps in Political Culture,” 91–92.
20. Pettersen, “The First Privately Produced Map in Norway with a Geodetic Reference 
Frame”; Zögner, China cartographica.
21. Smith, “Mapping China’s World,” 58.
22. See for instance, Jacob, “Towards a Cultural History of Cartography,” and Kagan and 
Schmidt, “Maps and the Early Modern State,” 661–63.
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distinction between cultural and scientific styles of representation.”23 
In other words, cartography did not simply evolve toward exactness, 
but responded to changing cultural conditions. The effectiveness of the 
Qing court and the literati in promoting the might of the empire through 
cartography depended on its ability to communicate its claims across 
the country in the language of indigenous maps, which the majority of 
educated Chinese had come to understand and respect. Consequently, 
the Qing court continued to build on the long tradition of indigenous 
Chinese mapping that dated back to the Han Dynasty.24
The Qing court launched a series of mapping projects featuring its 
maritime frontier. The size and extent of maritime frontiers that were 
recognized as having political or military value fluctuated during the 
Qing. Moreover, the maritime space claimed by the Qing court did not 
have an exact boundary. Instead, time and space were the foundation 
of Qing justifications for sovereignty over its maritime frontier. On 
the one hand, a long history of shared culture served as the basis for 
common bonds and a sense of belonging among the coastal population. 
This historical connection provided the empire with a form of authority 
that can be derived only from associations with the past. On the other 
hand, during the Qing, sovereignty required a degree of maritime 
militarization. Deploying warships to patrol sea zones on a regular basis 
provided the Qing court with the legitimacy to police the region and to 
spread its imperial might over the ocean. The limit of navy patrols, in 
some cases, also served as an indicator of the extent of imperial rule, or 
the outer boundary of the empire. The annexation of islands off China’s 
coast likewise displayed the state’s power. The Qisheng yanhai tu provides 
an excellent example of Qing scholar-officials graphically imposing their 
conceptualization of empire on the maritime landscape so as to serve the 
grand strategic vision of the Qing state toward the ocean.
In a discussion of Qing cartography in the early modern period, Laura 
Hostetler argues that too often we look at the Qing from the perspective 
of the nineteenth century.25 Historicizing Qing ethnographic and 
cartographic initiatives in the eighteenth century, Hostetler transcends 
the assumptions that have hindered our ability to conceptualize the Qing 
Dynasty as an independent entity with its own history and momentum. 
She argues that scholars need to get away from arguments based on 
23. Jeremy Black, Maps and History, 96.
24. See Cordell D. K. Yee, “Traditional Chinese Cartography and the Myth of 
Westernization.”
25. Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise, 26.
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assumptions about the superiority of European political and cartographic 
visions. In particular, she argues that the Qing not only participated in 
the development of cartography but also helped shape the early modern 
emphasis on empirical scientific knowledge.26 We can profit from 
approaching the yanhai tu in the same critical spirit in order to analyze 
the way the Qing interacted with the maritime frontier. Only then can we 
realize how the Qing helped to shape the East Asian maritime landscape 
and the global history of sea power in the early modern era.
The Coastal Map
Between the 1780s and 1880s, local officials produced several editions of 
the Qisheng yanhai tu. My goal is not to give an exhaustive account of 
these various editions, but to illustrate how the yanhai tu conveyed the 
imperial project of the Qing. The various extant versions of the yanhai 
tu contain few significant differences. For the purposes of this paper, 
I am essentially relying on three versions: the 1780s, 1866, and 1881 
editions, kept in the National Library in Beijing, the Library of Congress 
in Washington, and the Academia Sinica in Taipei, respectively.27 
Furthermore, judging from the style and textual information in the 
yanhai tu, it derives its basic features from a map entitled A Complete 
Map of the Coast (Yanhai quantu), which is attached to Things Heard 
and Seen from Foreign Countries (Haiguo wenjian lu) authored by Chen 
Lunjiong (?–1751). Yet the yanhai tu was more thorough and accurate in 
terms of the location of and distance between islands, reefs, and sandbars. 
Furthermore, compared to the Yanhai quantu, the yanhai tu provides 
more strategic and navigational details about harbors, cities, and islands 
through both graphic and paratextual information (see Figures 1 & 2).28
26. Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise, 25–32.
27. The different versions of the yanhai tu are printed on scrolls (ca. 32 x 894 cm). While the 
1780s version is printed in color (mainly red, myrtle green, and yellow), the other two editions 
are printed in black and white. The yanhai tu is highly regarded due to its artistic merits and 
attention to detail. The coastline and port cities are sharply delineated and clearly identified. 
The paratexts on the map are beautifully written and easily readable. A number of landmarks, 
including the Great Wall and Shanhai guan as well as the batteries and towers along the coast, 
are exquisitely featured. If we agree with Jeremy W. Crampton that maps should be studied 
according to a “tripartite classification system” — the map as (1) artifact, (2) image, and (3) 
vehicle — the artistic and cultural value of the yanhai tu certainly deserves our attention. For 
Crampton’s theory, see his The Political Mapping of Cyberspace, 185.
28. Unless stated otherwise, all maps used in this article are retrieved from the Geography 
and Map Division, Library of Congress.
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Figure 1. Detail showing the Guangdong sea space 
(Yanhai quantu, 1730 edition).
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Figure 2. Detail showing the Guangdong sea space (Yanhai tu, 1780s edition)
Unlike other maritime maps produced in the Ming-Qing period, 
such as the Topographic Map of Maritime Defense (Wanli haifang tu), the 
Complete Topographic Map of Maritime Defense of the United Empire 
(Qiankun yitong haifang quantu), and the coastal maps collected in 
the Siku quanshu (see Figure 3), the yanhai tu depicted the maritime 
frontier horizontally, placing the land mass of coastal China in the upper 
half of the map and the vast body of water in the lower half. The map 
renders the eastern side of China and the western side of the East Asian 
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Sea in a landscape orientation (see Figure 4).29 The 1780s version of the 
yanhai tu includes the following anonymous introduction describing the 
importance and significance of maritime governance:
Maritime defense is totally different from river defense. Even though 
we can construct watchtowers and fortresses along the coast as we 
build them along the rivers, the method (dao) of maritime governance 
is not the same as river management. In the past, we have books 
like The Complete Records of Maritime Defense (Haifang tongzhi) 
and the Illustrated Collection of Maritime Management (Chouhai 
tubian), but these books were more or less about the strategies for 
suppressing pirates. These books were also not up-to-date because the 
contemporary situation has changed dramatically. We are now living 
in a great empire with less violence and proper order. Our maritime 
frontier is secure. We not only have techniques to overcome flooding 
along the coast and rivers, we also set up a series of maritime policies 
to attract foreign traders to come visit our empire. These foreign 
merchants traded exotic goods, luxury products, and seafood from all 
over the world with us. There is no doubt that our coastal population 
has benefited considerably from this sea trade. However, we have to 
be aware of our elongated coastline from the north to south. There are 
numerous islands scattered along the coast. These are favorable places 
for pirates and other potential dangers. As a result, we cannot ignore 
our maritime frontier. Instead, we have to patrol the area cautiously 
and deliberately. But before we set up a scheme for naval patrolling, 
we must first evaluate coastal conditions. Even though it is true that 
the officials of each county are able to evaluate coastal conditions in 
29. Timothy Brook pointed out how looking at the yanhai tu was like “viewing the coast 
from the sea,” while in other maritime maps such as those produced in the Ming dynasty, it 
was like “looking at the sea from the coast.” Brook made this comment at a panel entitled 
“Frontiers in Late Imperial and Modern Asia: From Inner Mongolia to the East Asian Sea” 
at the AAS in Asia Conference (Taipei; June, 2015) (cited with permission). In fact, one of 
the very few exceptions that demonstrates the similar spirit of “viewing the coast from the 
sea” would be the Selden Map produced in the first half of the seventeenth century. As Brook 
argues, “the man who designed the map came up with an ingenious method for picturing the 
world by working from the sea and not from the land.” See Timothy Brook, Mr. Selden’s Map 
of China, 175. See also his forthcoming article, “Charting Maritime Asia,” in David Ludden 
(ed.), Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History, 12 (cited with permission).
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the province by referencing the respective gazetteers, the information 
recorded in the gazetteers is not comprehensive enough for a thorough 
overview of the entire maritime frontier of our empire. As far as I 
know, there is a comprehensive coastal map preserved in Beijing, but 
officials in other provinces rarely have the opportunity to examine it. 
This maritime map [the yanhai tu] was made using books and maps 
produced in the past, as well as a series of local surveys. Having this 
map in hand enables one to better understand the overall situation of 
our great maritime frontier.30
This introduction clearly indicates that the yanhai tu mapmaker was 
targeting a broader audience, mainly non-capital officials in different 
provinces. Even though the primary purpose of this yanhai tu is not 
clearly indicated, the introduction suggests that it was produced for the 
imperial court and the scholar-official community. This map aims not 
only to suggest defense against pirates and managing coastal issues, but to 
encourage officials to better evaluate the coastal conditions of the empire. 
If the Jesuit Atlas was a geographical overview (quanlan) depicting the 
territory of the realm,31 the yanhai tu was both a visual representation 
and cartographic diagram that allowed a select group of people to grasp 
the empire’s maritime frontier as accurately as possible. Furthermore, 
the 1866 edition of the yanhai tu includes a preface written in 1842 by 
Shao Tinglie, a native of Jiangsu. Shao mentions that the yanhai tu was 
produced by a scholar-official named Zhou Beitang who held several 
official titles related to maritime affairs in Zhejiang province. Yet in a 
study published in 2008, Wang Qiuhua pointed out that the yanhai tu was 
produced by Dong Gao in the 1790s; and it was the Qianlong emperor 
who ordered and directed Dong to produce the map.32 Even though it is 
not certain that Dong Gao was the first and only mapmaker of this yanhai 
tu, it and other coastal maps, such as the Map of Coastal Defense of 
Fujian (Fujian haifang tu) and the Map of Coastal Defense of Guangdong 
(Guangdong haifangtu), were part of a Qing empire-building project that 
took place before the outbreak of the First Opium War.
30. This passage is printed on the front sheet of the yanhai tu.
31. Geoffrey C. Gunn, First Globalization, 126; Fuchs, “Materialen zur Kartographie der 
Mandju-Zeit”; Perdue, China Marches West, 449. See also Jami, “The Jesuits’ Negotiation of 
Science between France and China (1685–1722),” 70.
32. Wang Qiuhua, “Qingdai Qianlong shiqi Qisheng Yanhai tu kao,” 98.
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Figure 3. A coastal map (printed in 1613) collected in Zhang Huang,
Sikuquanshu zhenben, “tushu bian,” juan 5, vol. 12, 5a.
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33. The languages (i.e. Manchu and Chinese) used in Qing maps have generated much 
scholarly interest among cartographic historians. Some argue that the uses of both Chinese 
and Manchu on maps reflects the juxtaposition of Chinese and Manchu identities. For 
example, in the largest edition of the Jesuit Atlas, place names within China’s provinces 
are written in Chinese characters whereas territory beyond, including Liaodong, is labeled 
exclusively in Manchu. See Matteo Ripa, “A Map of China and the Surrounding Lands Based 
on the Jesuit Survey of 1708–1716” (British Library, 1719). Therefore, as Laura Hostetler 
suggests, “we see [in the Kangxi Atlas] China as one distinct part of the larger Manchu empire. 
Its status as a colonized territory that formed only one part of the empire stands out vividly 
on this map.” See her Qing Colonial Enterprise, 75. The yanhai tu by contrast were printed 
entirely in Chinese with no Manchu script. It seems plausible that the exclusive use of Chinese 
language in the yanhai tu may have simply been to facilitate its use among Han officials.
34. For study of coastal maps in the Ming, see Schottenhammer and Ptak, eds., The 
Perception of Maritime Space in Traditional Chinese Sources, section “Maritime Space and 
Maps.”
Figure 4. Yanhai tu, Detail
The Bohai Sea
The yanhai tu clearly documents the topography of the Qing Empire. 
Most of the river-mouths, harbors, and islands are identified in Chinese.33 
Compared to representations in maritime atlases produced in the previous 
dynasties, where most littorals fade into the unknown,34 the coast was 
carefully mapped in the yanhai tu. The coastline was clearly delineated 
and the northern and northeastern borders were indicated in a short 
paratext printed on the map:
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The northern border of the maritime space begins from the coast 
of Tianjin and then [goes] all the way east to the Sea of Liaodong 
(Liaodong). This part of sea includes Iron Mountain Island, Yellow 
Castle Island, and Pi Island, facing the Korean peninsula. The 
northeastern border starts from the water off Shanhaiguan. This area 
of the sea covers Jinzhou island, Lüshun City, and the Yalü River 
mouth. The Yalü River mouth is the point that marks the boundary 
between the Qing and Choson Korea.
 The eastern part of the [Bohai Sea] is where the Shandong 
merchants made considerable profits. Dengzhou, a city located in 
Shandong, and Lüshun face each other. These waters are strategically 
important as they connect Pi Island in the east and the capital area in 
the west. The distance between Temple Island [an island situated off 
the eastern coast of Shandong] and Lüshun is 550 li. The journey only 
takes one night when sailing in favorable winds.
The above paratext introduces the mapped northern and the northeastern 
boundary of the late-eighteenth century maritime frontier. Using Tianjin 
as a starting point, the cartographer first draws our attention to the Bohai 
Sea, the closest maritime space to the capital area (jingji). The inscription 
indicates that the Bohai Sea is considered a strategic gateway linking three 
provinces: Zhili, Liaodong, and Shandong. In fact, the Bohai region was a 
seascape that the Qing rulers and their ministers determined to keep safe. 
As a Qing scholar-official in the late eighteenth century, Xue Chuanyuan, 
pointedly argued in another context,
Regarding previous studies on coastal defense, scholars generally saw 
the coast of Guangdong as the most strategic and important, followed 
by the coast of Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangnan, and finally Shandong and 
Liaodong (i.e. Bohai Sea). However, in my viewpoint, the importance 
of the Bohai region should come first mostly because it is the nearest 
sea space guarding Shengjing (the Manchu homeland) and Beijing (the 
center of the Qing Empire) against external threats and dangers.35
35. Xue Chuanyuan, Fanghai beilan, 13:140.
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In a similar spirit, the mapmaker of the yanhai tu also viewed the Bohai 
Sea as a sea space that the intended viewers of the map should study very 
carefully due to its proximity to central authority. It is worth noting that 
the map even provides the specific amount of time it took to sail from 
eastern Shandong to Lüshun harbor. Sailors and merchants at that time 
followed this route to travel between those two points.
This explanatory text also indicates the eastern limit of the Shandong 
coast. The mapmaker made it clear that “the eastern limit of Shandong 
province ends at Mount Cheng (Chengshan). Merchants intending to 
sail to Chengde and Tianjin use Mount Cheng as their standard point of 
departure.” Mount Cheng is located at the tip of the Shandong peninsula 
on the map, near Rongcheng City and Yangyuchi, two significant naval 
stations established by the Yongzheng emperor. They were administered 
by the Shandong navy and patrolled by the Rongcheng naval force 
(shuishi).36 This implies that Mount Cheng was securely protected by the 
Shandong navy and was one of the best strategic entrances to the Bohai 
area from Southern China (see Fig. 5).
 The fact that the map identifies coastal locations in the Bohai region 
makes it clear that the Qing paid considerable attention to the Bohai 
Sea. In the northern part of Shandong province as well as the southern 
part of the Liaodong peninsula, the names of the harbors were clearly 
labeled in Chinese. Even though the yanhai tu was not made to scale and 
bears no indication of latitude and longitude, the mapmaker was able 
to approximate the distances between these harbors. Compared with 
modern maps, distances represented in the yanhai tu are, in fact, very 
close to those calculated by contemporary geographers (see Figure 6). 
This underscores the fact that traditional Chinese coastal maps were not 
always inaccurate compared to western scientific maps.37
36. Shandong shifan daxue lishi xi Zhongguo jindaishi yanjiushi, ed., Qing shi lu Shandong 
shiliao xuan, 1753.
37. In fact, Qing monarchs in the eighteenth century were aware of the wide-ranging 
diversity of their empire and desired to produce accurate cartographic surveys based on 
thorough observation and personal consultation. As the French Jesuit Joseph-Anne-Marie 
de Moyriac de Mailla (1669–1748) recorded, “the Kangxi emperor’s desire is to have one atlas 
which would unite all the parts of his empire accurately in one glance.” See de Mailla, Histoire 
générale de la Chine, vol. II, 314. Similarly, Qianlong also requested that cartographic projects 
be uniform and comprehensive under his reign.
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Figure 5. Detail showing the Bohai Sea (Yanhai tu)
Figure 6. The Bohai Sea (Yanhai tu)
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The sea surrounding northern China out to the edge of the continental 
shelf is relatively shallow. The seafloor of the continental shelf is 
composed primarily of sand, silt, and mud from the Yellow River.38 This 
geographical feature was described in the yanhai tu as follows:
Between Haizhou and Miaowan is the mouth of the Yellow River. The 
sea is clearer than the Yellow River in terms of the amount of sediment. 
When sediment from the Yellow River flows into the sea, the bottom 
of the sea is elevated and the seabed structure changes. The depth of 
the seawater thus becomes shallower. In order to sail across the shallow 
waters, merchants must sail with sand ships (shachuan) constructed in 
the Jiangnan region. The bottom of a sand ship is flat and smooth, so 
it can enter the northern seawater with less obstruction. By contrast, 
merchant vessels constructed in Fujian called Minchuan [Fujian ships] 
usually have difficulty coping with this geographical situation because 
of the round-shape of the bottom of the Minchuan. The best way to 
sail across this section of sea is to wait for low tide. The receding tide 
means that the seawater will become deeper. It is safer to proceed in 
this circumstance.
The above paratext indicates the mapmaker’s familiarity with the 
topography, sedimentation, and tides of the Bohai Sea floor. He 
gives readers a reason why the Bohai Sea is shallow and suggests 
the type of ship that sailors should use to traverse the “troubled 
waters.” He also highlights guidelines for merchants to sail safely 
(see Figure 7). By providing general information regarding sailing 
and shipbuilding, this paragraph shows that the yanhai tu was 
not simply aimed at showcasing to scholar-officials the maritime 
territory governed by the Qing Empire. The mapmaker may also 
have hoped this general information would better enable scholar-
officials to analyze coastal conditions as well as appreciate the 
empire’s maritime frontier. Even though the map itself might not 
have circulated as widely as atlases showing the empire’s land 
territory, the content of the yanhai tu seems to be intended to 
enhance the reader’s strategic and geographical knowledge of the 
coast.
38. Pietz and Giordano, “Managing the Yellow River,” 100–101.
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The map also clearly indicates the littoral cities of Shandong, Zhili, and 
Liaodong provinces. Cities like Rongcheng, Ninghai, and Fushan were 
closely linked to coastal shipping and/or maritime militarization. For 
instance, Ninghai and Fushan were trading destinations for merchants 
from southeastern China, while Rongcheng was a naval base guarded 
by the Rongcheng naval force. The map depicts a region functionally 
interconnected across islands and coastal cities. The yanhai tu provides 
a conceptual map of the region as understood by eighteenth-century 
scholar-officials. In other words, they emphasize not the absolute 
distances and specific contours, but rather the interconnections and 
activities associated with particular locations. The makers of this map 
did not survey each sea port and island or even necessarily experience 
maritime travel before compiling the yanhai tu.39 And as Cordell Yee 
points out, “the classical Chinese language is highly metaphorical, 
and so are traditional Chinese maps.” In describing Chinese maps as 
metaphorical, Yee refers to the fact that Chinese maps did not have to 
be numerical, measurable, or even directly perceivable.40 Therefore, 
although the mapmakers may not have specified the precise geographical 
connections between seawaters, islands, and coastal cities, they presented 
information that their contemporaries would have found useful and 
meaningful, through metaphor and conceptual mapping.
In another passage, the mapmaker reminds us:
If you turn southwest from Mount Sheng, you can reach another 
cluster of islands located in the southern part of Shandong. If you 
continue sailing south, the maritime space between Shandong and the 
Jiangnan region is calm and risk-free.
The mapmaker left the maritime space between southern Shandong 
and the Jiangnan blank on the yanhai tu. This might be because the 
region “was calm and risk-free,” as the mapmaker notes, with no further 
description needed. Or it might have been because accurate information 
was not available, or because the area could not be surveyed in detail. 
39. As pointed out by Timothy Brook, some people even have the notion that Chinese 
(mostly in the Ming) were not seafarers and disapproved of compatriots who went to sea. See 
Brook, Mr. Selden’s Map of China, 111.
40. Cordell D.K. Yee, “Foundation for a Future History of Chinese Mapping,” 228.
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Some scholars might argue that a blank region on a map implies that it 
was beyond imperial control.41 It seems, in this case, extremely unlikely 
that the Qing would have abandoned its claim to this region during the 
long eighteenth century. According to imperial documents recorded in 
the Qing shilu and the Qing shigao, for example, the Jiangsu navy was 
assigned to police the respective sea zones linking the southern part of 
Shandong to the Jiangnan region. On occasion, the Jiangsu navy had to 
collaborate with the Shandong navy in patrolling this area to ensure it was 
“risk-free” for merchants and the coastal population.42 As a result, this sea 
connecting southern Shandong and Jiangsu was not insignificant at all, at 
least from a military perspective. In Qing political language, this sea space 
was clearly an “inner sea” according to the inner-outer conceptualization, 
which we will discuss more thoroughly in the next section.
Figure 7. Yanhai tu, Detail
41. Emma Jinhua Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography, 143.
42. Zhu Zhengyuan, Zhejiang yanhai tushuo, 1.
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Dividing the Maritime Frontier
The yanhai tu divides the maritime frontier into an inner sea space 
(neihai) and an outer sea space (waihai).43 During the Qing period, 
especially after the Kangxi emperor conquered Taiwan in 1684, officials 
tended to perceive the inner sea as the farthest extent of their maritime 
authority, a region legitimately subject to sustained governance and state 
possession; whereas the outer sea space was considered a capricious blue-
water domain beyond the reach of administrative control and economic 
extraction.
The ocean’s boundlessness made dividing lines between the inner and 
outer realms problematic. There are no clear physiographical boundaries 
such as mountain ranges or dense forests to help demarcate the two 
conceptual zones. The division of a natural and cohesive realm into two 
discrete parts was a sociopolitical construction rather than something 
based on fixed topography and ecology. While making little sense to 
seafaring peoples who regarded the sea as a more-or-less boundless 
resource for their survival, the separation into inner and outer ocean 
functioned primarily to set limits on the reach and responsibilities of the 
state and to regulate government operations across the sea space. The 
Qianlong emperor and his son Jiaqing (1760–1820; r. 1796–1820) noted 
that officials in coastal provinces dared not venture into the outer sea 
space. They often wrote off incidents in these waters as beyond their 
jurisdiction and thus insignificant. Some officials even ordered that 
official salt junks avoid passing over the outer ocean, suggesting the 
government had no business policing this unfamiliar sea space at all. 
While the outer sea represented where maritime governance ceased, as 
Wensheng Wang has argued,44 it was also a space where pirates sought 
to maximize their autonomy and power, as indicated as follows on the 
yanhai tu (see Fig. 8):
43. In the later edition of this yanhai tu, a dividing line ( fengjiae) was introduced to 
demarcate particular maritime sectors from one another. For example, the Shandong and 
Jiangsu sea spaces were divided by the “Shandong Jiangsu fengjie,” and the Zhejiang and the 
Fujian sea spaces by the “Zhejiang Fujian fengjie.”
44. Wensheng Wang, White Lotus Rebels and South China Pirates, chap. 3, “The Piracy 
Crisis in the South China Sea.”
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The sea off the coast of the ports of Qianyu and Jinghai has the 
reputation of being a pirate stronghold. In the morning, pirates massed 
their ships in the outer sea, watching for an opportunity to plunder the 
coast in the evening. They would also ravage the islands located on the 
western side. They used to hide out near those western islands under 
favor of the complex and variable tidal flow.
Figure 8. Yanhai tu, Detail
The yanhai tu sometimes identifies littoral space as waihai or waiyang 
(literally the “outer ocean”) (see Figure 9). In such cases, however, the 
word wai (outer) did not necessarily denote externality or exteriority. 
Based on the logic of Qing political ideology, the terms nei and wai are 
defined in relation to each other and can shift in meaning depending 
on vantage point. Thus, when juxtaposing rivers and seas, the Qing 
government, as well as other ruling elites, considered the sea to be a space 
“external” or wai in comparison to rivers. In this context, even the inner 
sea could be called waihai by the Qing government in contrast with 
neihe (inner rivers). For instance, the Veritable Records of the Qianlong 
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Figure 9. Yanhai tu, Detail
Emperor recorded that pirates and gangsters lurked in some areas of 
the waiyang off the Dongguang coast, whereas the “neihe (inner-river) 
region” was comparatively less troublesome (di bijin waiyang, yicang 
jianfei … dizai neihe, shiwu jianshao).45 When specifying the difference 
between waihai and neihe, the scholar-official Wu Shijun (1800–1883) also 
juxtaposed the two terms in his analyses of the maritime militarization 
along the coast. He wrote, “[until now], some obstinate officials still 
uphold the idea that it is much more practical to guard against invaders 
along the inner river [neihe] than to cross the ocean [waiyang] (yu zhu 
waiyang, buru yu zhu neihe).”46 Clearly, the sea was often conceptualized 
as an external space when mentioned in relation to the river-region. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that the former was necessarily 
less strategically attached to empire’s defense than the latter.
The terms nei and wai also were used to differentiate categories of 
sea space in relation to each other. For example, looking out at the ocean 
from the coast of Fuzhou, mapmakers termed the shallower, more easily 
accessible waters as the inner sea space. They termed waters beyond sight 
45. Da Qing Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu 155:662.
46. Wu Shijun, cited in Fuye shanfang, ed., Zhurong zuoshi zhenquan, 6:463–64.
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or reach as outer sea space.47 In this case, the deep seawater around the 
islands that were located a hundred miles away from Fujian would be 
labeled as the outer sea. In her discussion of the dividing line between the 
inner and outer ocean, Dian Murray explains this terminology:
Offshore, as the open expanse of the South China Sea stretched from 
the border of Guangdong and Fujian provinces, around Hainan island 
and the Leizhou peninsula to the Gulf of Tonkin, the saltwater realm 
of shallow seas and inshore islands were referred to in Chinese sources 
as the inner sea (neihai) or inner ocean (neiyang). Once the shallows 
deepened, the inshore islands gave way to offshore islands farther 
from the land, and the South China Sea became the southern ocean 
(nanyang). This region of deep seas, offshore islands and coral reefs 
constituted the outer sea (waihai) or outer ocean (waiyang).48
The Qing government invoked the terms inner and outer from a 
state-centered perspective. For instance, in most cases monarchs of the 
high Qing regarded seawater that was instrumental to their maritime 
and economic policies as inner sea, whereas anything that fell outside of 
the purview of such policies was seen as outer sea.49 When the Qianlong 
emperor prescribed the patrol perimeter (xunshao jiangji) of the Fujian 
navy, he declared that the navy was responsible for policing all of the 
assigned area across the “inner sea sector (liuzi neiyang xunqi).”50 On 
another occasion, he declared that inner sea was subject to imperial 
prerogative since it was more “manageable and accessible” (neiyang yiyu 
47. See Fang Junshi, Jiaoxuan suilu, 8: 35b–36a; Chen Changyuan, Guangdong tongzhi, 
123:1093; Jiang Chenying, Haifang zonglun in Congshu jicheng chubian, 3229, 8a–8b. In 
addition, the Chinese occasionally regarded the sea space beyond their sight and reach as an 
area where the pirates congregated and sat up their bases. See Chen Lunjiong, Haiguo wenjian 
lu “tianxia yanhai xingshi lu,” 1:2a–3a.
48. Murray, “Piracy and China’s Maritime Transition, 1750–1850,” 55.
49. See, for example, Da Qing Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu (Taipei: Xin wenfeng chuban 
gongsi, 1978), 232; see also Da Qing Shizong Xianhuangdi shilu (Taipei: Xin wenfeng chuban 
gongsi, 1978) juan 72, “Yizheng wang dachen deng yifu;” Da Qing Gaozong Chunhuangdi 
shilu, juan 105, “Jiangsu xunfu Zhangqu zou;” juan 167, dinghai,“Yuju Zhejiang tidu Peishi 
zou;” juan 176, “Zai ju Min-Zhe zongdu Nasutu zou.”
50. Da Qing Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu, juan 156, “Bingbu deng bu yizhun yuanshu 
Liangjiang zongdu Yangchaoceng huiyi” (Qianlong 156 nian, xinyou, shieryue, renchen shuo, 
jihai).
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kanding) than the waiyang.51 In the Record of Prominent Officials in 
the Qing (Guochao xianzheng shilüe), Li Yuandu (1821–87) also recalled 
the directive promulgated by Yongzheng to expel unregistered foreign 
battleships that anchored in or sailed across the inner sea space (waiyi 
bingchuan huoji neiyang, ju diaobing jishi quzhu).52 In Li’s account, 
the inner sea space was not conceptualized as a contact zone where 
international trade and cultural interactions could be forged freely. 
Instead, most of the maritime activities across the inner sea were under 
strict state supervision. From the 1720s onward, all maritime activities 
conducted by western merchants with their Chinese counterparts were 
mediated by government-designated guilds known as cohong.53 Partly 
as a measure of cultural protection, direct contact between Chinese 
(other than the cohong) and “barbarian merchants (yishang)” was strictly 
forbidden.54
The language of inner and outer could also be invoked to differentiate 
spaces within the “inner” or proximate waters. Cartographers and writers 
during the Qing, including the makers of the yanhai tu, deliberately 
divided the inner waters into another layer of wai and nei (see Fig. 10). 
As written by the cartographer of the yanhai tu, “the waiyang was 
strategically important, while the neiyang was full of scattered islands and 
tiny isles.” The author distinguishes between inner and outer primarily 
based on the depth of seawater and the geographical distances off the 
coast. On one hand, because large-sized war junks found it difficult to 
come close to shore in a low tide, only smaller warships were effective in 
carrying out the policing there. Large war junks were thus responsible 
for patrolling the deeper “outer coastal water” (a part of “outer water” 
that was notably still included in the inner sea region) so as to “defend the 
51. Da Qing Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu, juan 750, “Xingbu deng bu yifu: Liangjiang 
zongdu Gaojin dengzou, xunfang haiyang ge shiyi” (Qianlong 30 nian, yiyou, shier yue, 
renyin shuo, bingchen).
52. Li Yuandu, Guochao xianzheng shilüe [collected in Sibu beiyao] (Taipei: Taiwan 
Zhonghua shuju, 1989), vol. 46, juan 21, “Mingchen Wu Huaijiang gongbao shilüe,” 275.
53. According to John Phipps, the cohong system system was founded in the 1790s by the 
merchant Pang Qiguan, whereas Immanuel Hsu believed that it started in the 1720s. Immanuel 
Hsu, The Rise of Modern China [Chinese edition] (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 
2001), 149.
54. Gang Zhao has recently published a ground-breaking and fresh analysis of the system, 
in which he successfully demonstrates the uniqueness, adaptability, flexibility, and openness of 
the High Qing cohong policy. See The Qing Opening to the Ocean, esp. chap. 6.
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frontier” (han bianchui). On the other hand, small patrol warships were 
given the duty of policing the shallower “inner coastal water” so as to 
“strengthen the foundation” (cun genben). Another illustrative example 
appears in the Overview of Coastal Defense in Guangdong (Guangdong 
haifang huilan) published in the 1760s. Across the Guangdong sea space, 
the maritime military consisted of 167 war junks of various sizes in the 
1700s. In order to interdict smuggling activities occurring in shallower 
seawaters, the inner sea space was divided in 1730 into two sectors based 
on the aforementioned logic. Therefore, the 167 vessels (and perhaps 
even more) were divided into 38 separate units under the command of 
an admiral (shuishi tidu) along the Guangdong coast, covering some 
3,000 li from Chaoyang on the eastern flank to Hainan on the western 
flank. Islets, harbor-areas, shoals, and half-tide rocks were meticulously 
patrolled by the “inner-water fleet,” while the “outer-water fleet” was 
responsible for policing the region at a greater distance. Yet unfortunately, 
the exact limit (in nautical miles) patrolled by the “outer-water fleet” was 
never recorded in official gazetteers or memoirs. Still, sources do note 
that land-based military units across Guangdong, which were close to 
seaports, had the dual responsibility of cooperating with the “inner- and 
outer-water fleets” to help defend the maritime frontier.55
55. Lu Kun and Deng Tingzhen, eds., Guangdong haifang huilan, 12: 25a–27b.
Figure 10. Yanhai tu, Detail
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The Qing government also sought to demarcate “inner” and “outer” 
zones on land in their diplomatic negotiations along the inner Asian 
frontiers. Under the tributary system, the Manchu court deliberately 
divided its tributary states into inner polities (dependencies) and outer 
polities. Only the inner polities (such as Nepal and Kanjut) were granted 
military protection;56 the outer polities (such as Tashkent, Bukhara, 
Badakhshan, and Kazakas) were client states that were not directly linked 
to the Qing Empire.57 In 1751, for instance, the Qianlong emperor issued 
an imperial decree stating that
our dynasty has unified the vast terrain that lies within the frontiers. 
The various barbarians, inner and outer, have submitted and turned 
toward civilization. Each of them has a different costume and 
appearance. We order the governor-general and provincial governors 
along the frontiers to have illustrations made copying the likeness of 
the clothing and ornaments of the Miao, Yao, Li, Zhuang, under their 
jurisdiction, as well as of the outer barbarians, and to submit these 
illustrations to the Grand Council, so that they may be compiled and 
arranged for an imperial survey.58
In this edict, Qianlong not only instructs his officials to compile the 
Imperial Tribute Illustrations of the Great Qing (Huang Qing zhigong 
tu), but also deploys the inner-outer binary as a language of governance 
and control. Here, the language of “inner” and “outer” asserts Qing 
power over certain regions and peoples — whether on land or sea.59 By 
the eighteenth century, as Pamela Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald 
S. Sutton have argued, “these degrees of inner and outer were distinctly 
56. See Di Cosmo, “Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia.”
57. See Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia c. 1800,” 35–38.
58. See Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi, ed., Qing zhigong tu xuan, 3; this imperial edict is 
translated by Emma Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography, 149.
59. Some scholars such as Pitman B. Potter also apply the inner-outer model to analyze 
the PRC’s frontier management. According to Potter, “conditions in China’s inner and outer 
peripheries serve as an essential context for understanding China’s policies of governance 
and control.” By inner periphery, the author refers to Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang, where 
constitutional arrangements of local governance were applied. The outer periphery covers 
Hong Kong and Taiwan, where the Beijing authorities established the “special administrative 
region” or applied another constitutional model of governance. See Pitman B. Potter, 
“Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives on the Periphery,” 249.
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narrative, that is, they might be contrasted to moral, ethical, or cultural 
criteria.”60 The inner-outer model thus is demonstrably hierarchical, with 
the innermost enjoying the greatest intimacy with the ruling lineage and 
the outermost having the least.
Expanding the Imperial Gaze to Taiwan and Nan’ao
Taiwan and the South China Sea are striking examples of formerly 
external territories that were incorporated into the Chinese Empire very 
late in its history. Even when the Kangxi emperor conquered Taiwan 
in the late seventeenth century, he showed little appreciation for the 
island. As he explained to his officers, “Taiwan is a place beyond the sea; 
it is no bigger than a ball of mud. We gain nothing by possessing it.”61 
Consequently, the court’s emissary Su Bai proposed to abandon the island 
once the remaining rebel troops and the Chinese civilian population 
were evacuated. The majority of the high officials in Beijing supported 
this plan; only Shi Lang, the admiral who led the conquest of Taiwan, 
voiced an objection. Far from being a wasteland, Shi asserted, Taiwan 
was strategically situated and amply endowed with natural resources 
and arable land. The Qing should not abandon this strategic island 
guarding its maritime frontier. To Shi, Taiwan served as a kind of palisade 
protecting the empire from outside invaders — not a ball of mud outside 
of the Qing domain.62 The question of whether or not to withdraw from 
Taiwan became a topic for heated debate in the late seventeenth century. 
After learning more about Taiwan’s situation, the emperor finally sided 
with Shi Lang and had the island officially “included in the register” (ru 
bantu) of the Qing empire in the spring of 1684 as the ninth prefecture of 
Fujian.63
Immediately following the annexation of Taiwan into Fujian province, 
the compilers of the 1684 edition of the Gazetteer of Fujian (Fujian 
tongzhi), who had already completed a draft, scrambled to add a map of 
this new territory to that edition. The map, entitled “A Map of Taiwan 
60. Crossley, Siu, and Sutton, eds., introduction to Empire at the Margins, 15.
61. Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi (ed.), Qing Shengzu shilu xuanji, 129.
62. Shi Lang, Jinghai jishi, 60–63.
63. On the history of the Qing annexation of Taiwan and its political and economic 
development in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Shepherd, Statecraft and 
Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800.
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Prefecture and its Three Counties,” was appended to the overall map 
of the Fujian coast.64 This is probably the earliest Qing imperial map to 
include Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait in its domain. From that time on, 
Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait appeared as important territorial features 
in many Qing mapping projects, including the yanhai tu. Like the 1684 
edition of the Fujian gazetteer, the yanhai tu contains a separate map 
of Taiwan entitled “Map of Taiwan” (Taiwan tu) (see Figure 11). Unlike 
the gazetteer, the yanhai tu includes Taiwan in the overall map of the 
China coast. Illustrating the coastline of the island, the “Map of Taiwan” 
focuses on important Chinese landmarks such as the prefectural and 
county seats and important forts, as well as the central port of entry to 
the island. Much like most other maps of Taiwan, the Taiwan tu projects 
the dominance of the western region of Taiwan, the center of Chinese 
settlement since the Ming period.
Judging from the textual information on the Taiwan tu, it very 
probably derives its basic features from the maps printed in the Fujian 
tongzhi and the Taiwan tu in the Haiguo wenjian lu. Yet some of the 
yanhai tu’s specific features differ from the maps in the Fujian gazetteer 
and the wenjianlu. For instance, the yanhai tu depicts Taiwan as a long 
64. Liu Liangbi et al., Chongxiu Fujian Taiwan fuzhi, 100.
Figure 11. Taiwan tu
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narrow island (with the west and the east coasts separately mapped on 
the Taiwan tu and the Taiwan houshan tu respectively), rather than 
roundish, as in the gazetteer map. Compared to the map attached to 
the wenjianlu, the Taiwan tu provides more important navigational 
information about bays and approaches to the island (see Fig. 12 & 13). 
Notwithstanding these differences, the cartographic and conceptual 
frameworks of both maps clearly represent Taiwan from the perspective 
being approached externally from the Chinese coast. In other words, 
it is a symbolic representation showcasing the successful projection of 
Qing imperial control across the Taiwan Strait to the island. Significantly, 
the yanhai tu was among the first maps to expose viewers to the eastern 
side of Taiwan. As Emma Teng has argued, maps of Taiwan produced in 
the early and mid-Qing primarily focused on the western coast of the 
island. The eastern coast, by contrast, was always missing. Teng cites this 
practice as an example that shows how “Taiwan was itself the boundary 
between inner and outer” in terms of frontier management.65 Another 
separate map included in the yanhai tu, entitled the “Map of Taiwan 
behind the Mountains” (Taiwan houshan tu), tells a different story (see 
Fig. 14). It maps and introduces to its viewers the eastern part of Taiwan. 
Even though the houshan tu looks crudely sketched, it introduces some 
navigable ports and accessible cities, as well as mountain features on 
eastern Taiwan. This cuts across the Central Mountain Range, which had 
long been considered a visual barrier between western Taiwan (part of 
the Qing empire) and eastern Taiwan (beyond the empire) and had long 
served as the horizon separating the inner and outer realms.66 The entire 
island, as mapped in the Taiwan tu and the houshan tu, was included as 
a significant part of the maritime frontier that guarded the southeastern 
coast of China. As the author of Record of a Tour of Duty in the Taiwan 
Strait (Taihai shicha lu) noted, “Taiwan extends from the northeast to the 
southwest like a standing screen: it is the outer boundary for China’s four 
coastal provinces.”67
65. Emma Jinhua Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography, 55–60.
66. Qing writers commonly referred to Taiwan as an island which faced the sea and was 
backed by the (central) mountains, rimmed by mountains, or pillowed on mountains. For 
instance, see Huang Shujing, Taihai shicha lu, 7.
67. Huang Shujing, Taihai shicha lu, 3.
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Figure 12. Taiwan tu (Haiguo wenjian lu)
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Figure 13. Taiwan tu (Yanhai tu)
Figure 14. Taiwan houshan tu
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Taiwan is not the only maritime island that was closely linked to concerns 
over coastal defenses across the maritime frontier. As highlighted in 
the yanhai tu, Nan’ao Island was another gateway which guarded the 
southeastern coast of China. The yanhai tu mapmaker said this about the 
small island (see Fig. 15):
Situated in the eastern part of the great ocean, Nan’ao is the stronghold 
guarding the maritime frontier. It is a strategic island in the waters 
off the Fujian and the Guangdong coasts. In particular, it protects the 
eastern coast of Guangdong province. The coastline of Nan’ao island 
is approximately 300 li, with four important harbors. The harbor in 
the eastern part of the island is named Qing’ao; it is not favorable for 
anchoring. The harbor in the western part is called Sheng’ao. It is a nice 
harbor that can accommodate more than a thousand vessels.
Figure 15. Nan’ao Island (Yanhai tu)
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In fact, no discussion of coastal defense on the southeast coast during 
late imperial times could possibly omit Nan’ao.68 This small island was 
situated at the intersection of the Fujian and Guangdong sea zones. In 
the Ming, before it was turned into a strategic naval base, this island 
was a paradise for pirates. In 1576, following a proposal by the maritime 
defense General Luo Gongchen, a lieutenant colonel was assigned to the 
island, and a walled defense fortification was built. The strategic position 
of Nan’ao continued to be highly valued in the eighteenth century.69 The 
Qing court was determined to develop Nan’ao into a bastion against 
piracy and to integrate it into its imperial domain.70 The most important 
aspect of this was the establishment of five maritime garrisons on the 
island, as the yanhai tu shows. Such measures not only helped strengthen 
the island’s defense against potential intruders but also provided a fine 
example of maritime governance in island management and the imperial 
motivation to extend territorial jurisdiction across the maritime frontier.
By mapping and illustrating the strategic importance of Taiwan 
and Nan’ao in the yanhai tu, the mapmaker served to decrease their 
distance from the coast of China (in conceptual and real terms).71 
In this connection, the case of Taiwan is particularly illuminating. 
Although Qing maritime writings and gazetteers often opened with the 
conventional invocation “Taiwan was originally a remote wilderness 
beyond the sea with no connection to China proper,”72 coastal maps like 
the yanhai tu highlighted Taiwan’s proximity and significance. In this 
way, the yanhai tu not only helped serve the practical needs of imperial 
administration, but arguably served an important discursive function, in 
68. Chin-keong Ng, “Maritime Frontiers, Territorial Expansion and Hai-fang,” 232.
69. The Dutch also showed a keen interest in this strategic island. See Weichung Cheng, 
War, Trade and Piracy in the China Seas (1622–1683), 42–46.
70. However, it is worth noting that the violence of petty piracy in the eighteenth century 
rarely crossed over into the level of professional piracy and, thus, posed little threat to either 
government or commerce. See Paola Calanca, “Piracy and Coastal Security in Southeastern 
China, 1600–1780,” 85–98. During this period, piracy was indeed small scale, but the reason 
for this must be acknowledged. I believe that the structured and comprehensive management 
of the inner sea (by the navy and the customs offices) was key to the coast’s relative 
peacefulness.
71. Most of the maps produced earlier had depicted Taiwan as being farther away from the 
mainland than this yanhai tu. In some maps, Taiwan is even not indicated or introduced.
72. June Yip, Envisioning Taiwan, 15.
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linking the island symbolically to the Qing imperial domain across its 
maritime frontier.
Conclusion
Earlier scholarship has tended to deny the maritime initiatives and 
concerns of the Qing court before nineteenth-century western 
encroachment. More recent accounts have tended to consider the Qing 
Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and India’s Mughal Empire as continental 
empires, with only weak connections to maritime management and 
coastal governance. Yet, as the cartographic examples from the yanhai 
tu presented in this article demonstrate the Qing empire clearly took an 
interest in its maritime frontiers during the eighteenth century.
Although the yanhai tu mainly depicts the coastal littoral, or “inner 
sea space,” its mapmaker was acutely aware of the importance of maritime 
administration and territorial jurisdiction. The content of the yanhai 
tu conveys a close connection with strategic concerns. The mapmaker 
not only pointed out favorable routes for seafarers, but helped establish 
a grand strategy for the maritime frontier by mapping the locations of 
seaports, harbors, and islands, detailing the importance and significance 
of maritime defense, dividing the inner sea into separate yet interlinked 
maritime sectors, and fixing the limits of governance across the maritime 
frontier. Arguably the yanhai tu was a project that displayed imperial 
control over the coastal frontier while conveying systematic knowledge 
of the maritime space at a time when the Qing was able to sustain its 
territorial integrity across its coastal seas.
In short, through a close visual and textual reading of the yanhai 
tu, this study highlights Qing official engagement with the maritime 
frontier during the eighteenth century. The map reflects the extent to 
which maritime commerce, defense, and migration had been a major part 
of Chinese life along the coast.73 As suggested by Gang Zhao, the High 
73. The 1980s and the 1990s saw a dramatic growth of literature on maritime connections 
between China and the rest of the world in the Ming and Qing dynasties. For instance, 
William Atwell brought to light the “great impact flow of world silver” upon the Ming and 
Qing economy; see his “International Bullion Flows and the Chinese Economy, circa 1530–
1650” and “Some Observations on the ‘Seventeenth-Century Crisis’ in China and Japan.” 
Chin-keong Ng has traced the development of coastal private trade in Amoy during the 
eighteenth century while touching upon some aspects of High Qing maritime policies. See his 
Trade and Society.
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Qing was not a conservative power but rather manifested reasonable and 
flexible attitudes towards the maritime world.74 At the same time however, 
although Chinese traders and settlers played significant roles beyond the 
China coast, or the “inner sea,” the Qing state only very occasionally 
drew on their knowledge and their presence in Southeast and South Asia. 
As Matthew W. Mosca has eloquently asserted, the Qing “information 
order” extended only tentatively towards Southeast and South Asian 
waters in the eighteenth century.75 The primary focus of Qing strategists 
(such as the imperial officials, naval commanders, as well as the makers 
and compilers of coastal maps) was to maximize the natural advantages 
it enjoyed along the coast. Operations in familiar seawaters enabled the 
navy to exploit as much as possible opportunities for deception, cover, 
and protection. A thorough survey and understanding of the maritime 
frontier was thus indispensable. Coastal mapping was, therefore, not 
only a tool to showcase the projection of state power onto the sea, but 
a way to update the imperial court and the community of officials with 
the most current information on the conditions of the maritime frontier. 
The compilation of the yanhai tu was a mapping project that served these 
diverse purposes.
74. Gang Zhao, The Qing Opening to the Ocean, 14.
75. See Mosca, From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy, 3.
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GLOSSARY
Bohai  渤海
Chouhai tubian  籌海圖編
cun genben 存根本
dao  道
di bijin waiyang, yicang jianfei…… 地逼近外洋, 易藏奸匪…… 
 di zai neihe, shiwu jianshao   地在內河, 事務簡少 
dinghai  定海
Dong Gao  董誥
Fujian haifang tu  福建海防圖
Guangdong haifang huilan  廣東海防彙覽
Guangdong haifang tu  廣東海防圖
Haifang tongzhi  海防通志
Haiguo wenjianlu  海國聞見錄
haijiang  海疆
haitu  海圖
haiyang zhishi  海洋之事
han bianchui  捍邊陲
Huang Qing zhigong tu  皇清職貢圖
Huangyu quanlan tu  皇輿全覽圖
Jinghai hou 靖海侯
jinghai  靖海
jingji  京畿
liuzi neiyang xunqi  留資內洋巡緝
Minchuan 閩船
neihai  內海
neiyang yiyu kanding  內洋易於勘定
Qiankun yitong haifang quantu 乾坤一統海防全圖
Qingshi gao  清史稿
Qing shilu  清實錄
Qisheng yanhai tu  七省沿海圖
quanlan  全覽
Rongcheng  榮成
ru bantu  入版圖
shachuan  沙船
Shao Tinglie  邵廷烈
Chengshan  成山
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shuishi tidu   水師提督
shuishi   水師
Taiwan houshan tu   臺灣後山圖
waihai   外海
waiyi bingchuan huoji neiyang,   外夷兵船或寄內洋,  
 ju diaobing jishi quzhu    俱調兵立時驅逐 
Wanli haifang tu   萬里海防圖
xunshao jiangji   巡哨疆界
Yangyuchi   養魚池
Yanhai quantu   沿海全圖
yu zhu waiyang, buru yu zhu neihe   禦諸外洋, 不如禦諸內河
Zhou Beitang   周北堂
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